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STUDY PROJECT

SERVICE UNIQUENESS - STUMBLING BLOCKS TO JOINTNESS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT R. BUCKLEY

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jointness. Mandating jointness is one thing, achieving it is something else. Each service is the guardian of deeply seated, cherished traditions which impact profoundly on how it views and administers its profession. Each has built its warfighting doctrine upon the bedrock foundation of lessons learned in combat. Roles and missions are guarded jealously. Each service competes for scarce resources, be they manpower to fill their ranks, or defense appropriations for needed programs. Strong and emotional feelings abound. When faced with jointness, the inherent beliefs and values of the services, combined with ever present competition can create friction with resultant animosity and lack of cooperation. This paper will delve into the causes of friction between the services relying on a historical perspective where possible. It will identify and explore the services' unique roles and missions, views of warfighting, and ways of doing business which hinder cohesion, and recommend ways of reducing or eliminating them.

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SERVICE UNIQUENESS - STUMBLING BLOCKS TO JOINTNESS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Buckley

Colonel Richard Troy
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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One constant in the drumbeat for military reform during the nineteen seventies and eighties has been the need for true co-operation among the United States' Military Services. Predicated on the belief that success in future military operations across the spectrum of conflict will require the skills and assets of all the services working together as a cohesive force, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandated that the military services initiate means to facilitate true jointness. Mandating jointness is one thing, achieving it is something else. Each service is the guardian of deeply seated, cherished traditions which impact profoundly on how it views and administers its profession. Each has built its warfighting doctrine upon the bedrock foundation of lessons learned in combat. Roles and missions are guarded jealously. Each service competes for scarce resources; be they manpower to fill their ranks, or defense appropriations for needed programs. Strong and emotional feelings abound. When faced with jointness, the inherent beliefs and values of the services, combined with ever present competition, can create friction with resultant animosity and lack of cooperation. This paper will delve into the causes of friction between the services relying on a historical perspective where possible. It will identify and explore the services' unique roles and missions, views of warfighting, and ways of doing business which hinder cohesion, and recommend ways of reducing or eliminating them. Joint military activities; Department of Defense. (info)

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SERVICE UNIQUENESS -
STUMBLING BLOCKS TO JOINTNESS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Gentlemen, we are the South Pacific Fighting Force. I don't want anybody even to be thinking in terms of Army, Navy, or Marines. Every man must understand this, and every man will understand it, if I have to take off his uniform and issue coveralls with 'South Pacific Fighting Force' printed on the seat of his pants.¹

Admiral William F. (BULL) Halsey
South Pacific 1942

If Coach Bear Bryant ... put his quarterback in Virginia, his backfield in North Carolina, his offensive line in Georgia, and his defense in Texas, and then got Delta Airlines to pick them up and fly them to Birmingham on game day he would not have had his winning record. We went out, found bit and pieces, people and equipment, brought them together occasionally and asked them to perform a highly complex mission. The parts all performed, but they didn't necessarily perform as a team.²

Colonel Charles Beckwith
Washington, D.C. 1980

The struggle to improve jointness is high on the agenda of each of the U.S. Military Services today. The idea that the services are parochial in their thinking, self-serving in their actions, and simply do not work well together has caused mandated changes. Through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986, Congress has tightened down on the military services in an attempt to force interservice cooperation and unity of effort.

As the quotes at the beginning of this chapter indicate, the problem is long standing. Thirty-eight years span the time from Bull Halsey's efforts to achieve interservice harmony during his campaign across the Pacific, to the frustration experienced by Colonel Charles Beckwith during the failed hostage rescue mission in Iran. Even more recently, Senator Sam Nunn criticized the services' performance in Grenada. In sum, he faulted the services for failing to coordinate properly, poor communications, poor command relationships, and lack of understanding how the other services operate.³

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was a major step toward achieving true jointness. It streamlined command relationships, increased the power of the warfighting CINCs, established policy for joint duty officers, and generated keener interest in joint doctrine and interoperability issues. The purpose of this paper is to focus on an obstacle to jointness relatively untouched by recent legislation; specifically, service unique institutional motivations and views of warfighting which inevitably lead to institutional bias and blindness toward sister service motivations and contributions.

Using world famous psychologist Abraham Maslow's theory of motivation as a frame of reference, roles and missions will be identified as basic survival needs of each service, and a continuing cause of interservice friction. Further, Clausewitz's

Center of Gravity will be used to identify service unique views of warfighting which can lead to parochialism in the joint arena. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn concerning each service's perspective toward jointness based on its degree of reliance on other services in order to fulfill its wartime roles.

Active efforts are required to overcome or at least reduce these subjective barriers to jointness. This paper will conclude with some specific recommendations on how the services can attack these problems through leadership, education, and training. It is hoped that that the information contained herein will be of benefit to any officer currently holding, or enroute to, a joint billet.

BACKGROUND

Why all the concern about the services working together as a cohesive force? The inability of the services to act in harmony for the good of the country rather than as independent entities whose primary goal is self-enhancement has been a constant theme espoused by the most recent military reform movement. Arthur Hadley's Straw Giant criticizes the armed services for funding first those missions that they consider vital to their self interest and for placing their ablest people in those missions. Other tasks get what is left over even though they may be equally important to the defense of the nation.⁴ The critical lack of sealift comes immediately to mind.

In his essay The Evolution of Central U.S. Defense Management, Vincent Davis takes the services to task.

The heart of the opposition was distrust among the uniformed leaders toward each other - distrust born of decades of intense competition and of even more decades of existence in their separate tribal cultures largely isolated from one other. To expect Air Force Generals and Navy Admirals fully to trust one another is akin to expecting a large number of Greeks and Turks fully to trust each other.⁵

Edward Luttwak's The Pentagon and the Art of War severely criticizes the military procurement system. Specifically, he targets the reluctance of one service to buy a weapons system

developed by another service. He coins this the "not-invented-here-syndrome." The consequences are duplicative research and development, and smaller service buys with higher unit costs.⁶

These are just some examples from the seemingly endless list of books and articles espousing military reform. Also feeding the breeches of the reformer's cannons are the series of more recent U.S. military operations which either failed or were accomplished with less than glowing praise. Mr. Luttwak's The Pentagon and the Art of War chastised the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force for trying to influence the running of the Viet Nam war, while closely watching one another to protect the diverse interests of their different services.⁷

In To Arm a Nation, Richard Halloran had this to say about the 1975 Mayaguez rescue mission:

After the seizure of Mayaguez ... a hastily assembled and inadequately informed force of Navy, Marine, and Air Force units lost 41 men trying to rescue the ship's crew--only to find that the Cambodians had already let them go.⁸

Mr. Halloran recognized that the force put together for that operation was probably the best that could be assembled given the severe time constraints, but was highly critical of the decision making process and inaccurate and slow intelligence support.

The bombing of the Marine headquarters in Beirut in 1983, while not criticized as being the result of interservice friction, was certainly labeled as a failed military effort. The literature is replete with condemnation of the Marines for failing to provide adequate security. Another bullet for the military reformers.

In their essay Rewriting the Key West Accord, Morton and David Halperin chastised the services for their lack of cooperation during the 1983 Grenada invasion.

Instead of inserting cohesive, permanent units, the United States deploys improvised coalitions of forces who must on the spot, learn to work with strangers. Mission planning degenerates into bargaining among generals and admirals, each seeking a sizeable piece of the action for his service.⁹

The passages listed above are but a small sample of the voluminous amount of literature espousing the need for closer cooperation among the services. The fact is that outsiders have recognized a problem and have relentlessly pursued it. Because of their constant drumbeat, a Congressional Military Reform Caucus was formed in 1981 consisting of over 130 members of Congress. It was the only group in Congress that included both liberals and conservatives, other than a few caucuses that represent geographic areas.¹⁰ From this caucus, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was spawned.

With the background set, let us now get on with the business of trying to understand why the services often find themselves at odds and look toward what we in the military can do to ease the friction. Our great nation demands nothing less.

ENDNOTES

1. Elmer Potter, Bull Halsey, p. 186.
2. Richard Halloran, To Arm a Nation, p. 151
3. Ibid., p. 174.
4. Arthur Hadley, The Straw Giant, p. 27.
5. Vincent Davis, "The Evolution of Central U.S. Defense Management," in Reorganizing America's Defense, ed. by Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis and Samuel P. Huntington, p. 159.
6. Edward Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War, p. 182.
7. Ibid., p.28.
8. Halloran, p. 19.
9. Morton H. Halperin and David Halperin, "Rewriting the Key West Accord," in Reorganizing America's Defense, ed. by Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis and Samuel P. Huntington, p. 352.
10. Gary Hart and William S. Lind, America Can Win, p. 9.

SERVICE UNIQUENESS -
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CHAPTER II

SURVIVAL

HIERARCHY OF NEEDS

World famous psychologist Abraham Maslow is perhaps best known for his theory of human motivation which he termed The Hierarchy of Needs. Basically, the theory purports that man's strongest motivation is to survive. To do this he will do whatever is necessary to obtain the basic needs of food, water, shelter and security. Only after these basic needs are satisfied does he become motivated to seek higher order needs which culminate with the attainment of self-actualization. Self-actualization equates to the sense of worth and gratification one obtains from knowing that he has become the best that he can be in whatever human endeavor he pursues. Maslow's theory may be as applicable to organizations as it is to humans.¹

If Maslow's theory is applicable to organizations, a look at the military services from this perspective may provide some insight into the causes of interservice friction. For a service to defend the country it must first survive as an organization. To survive, it must satisfy a stated national need. For a military service this equates to providing a viable force to assist the United States in achieving its national security objectives. The service must be perceived as a contributor or face the threat of a reduced mission or even disestablishment.

The true measure of a service's contribution is its assigned roles and missions. Like humans whose basic survival needs are nourishment, shelter, and safety, the services' basic survival needs are resources. Without roles and missions the services cannot hope to obtain the funding to procure manpower, weapons and equipment. There is a direct relationship between roles and missions and funding. The more critical a service's assigned missions are perceived, the more funding it is likely to receive. The more funding it receives, the more influential the service becomes; the better it is able to perform its missions, the more its survival is guaranteed.

Since roles and missions beget funding and influence, they are jealously guarded. As we will see in the next section, the competition over roles and missions among the services is longstanding. This competition has been and is today a major source of interservice friction and rivalry. Only through a common understanding of this phenomenon can we hope to reduce the friction in favor of interservice cooperation.

ROLES AND MISSIONS

We have been a house divided against ourselves... Certain groups lobby against corrective actions because they impact on service prerogatives. It has always amazed me how military people can expect loyalty from their subordinates, and yet they do not give it to the Secretary of Defense when it comes to issues that impact on service roles and missions.²

Lawrence J. Korb
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 1985

In Asa Clark's essay Interservice Rivalry and Military Reform, the author contends that the service conceptions of their core roles and missions - those reflecting a service's organizational essence - are predictable and have continued generally to reflect the maxim that "armies walk, navies sail, and air forces fly." These role conceptions have been based on the combat medium rather than the combat mission.³ Traditionally there has been little rivalry over the core missions. The Army is the generally accepted force for fighting major land campaigns, the Navy for sea control, the Air Force for strategic bombing and air superiority, and the Marines for traditional amphibious operations in support of a naval campaign.

While there has been general acceptance among the services over core missions, secondary or peripheral missions have been the subject of fierce competition. In Straw Giant, Arthur Hadley cites an example in the bitter battle fought between the Army and Air Force over the antiaircraft mission. The Air Force contended that it was a logical extension of their air control mission. After all, airplanes shoot down airplanes. Why shouldn't the Air Force control ground weapons systems which perform the same mission? The Army argued that antiaircraft was an extension of artillery and therefore should remain its responsibility. The Army saw the antiaircraft mission as a means of getting its foot in the door of the world of missiles. The Air Force saw the additional funding and structure that would come with this new mission. The Army won but only after bitter battling between the two services.⁴

A more current example is the ongoing competition for missions in the low-intensity conflict environment. Both the Army and the Marine Corps are feverishly developing new low-intensity conflict doctrine. Both foresee opportunities for future employment in this environment and are preparing for the mission. The Army has resurrected the concept of light infantry to better suit the environment. The Marines are reminding decision makers that they have always possessed light infantry capabilities, and that the Marine-Air-Ground Task Force has high utility in low-intensity conflict. Both are jockeying for position. Undoubtedly, both honestly believe they can do the job for the nation and are motivated to do so.

Another source of conflict between the services arises over missions of one service that directly affect another service. One of the Navy's missions is sealift. The Army and Marines need sealift to get to the battle and to provide for sustainment. The Navy has traditionally placed lower priority on sealift in favor of aircraft carriers, surface combatants, and submarines. As a result, there is a shortage of sealift which causes the Army and Marine Corps much concern.⁵

A second example, one that the author observed while a student at the U.S. Army War College, is the emotional debate between the Army and Air Force over the close air support mission. Some Army officers clearly believe that the Air Force does not place enough priority on the mission. They are frustrated by the perception that close air support ranks behind strategic bombing, air interdiction, and air superiority on the Air Force priority

list. Further fueling their anxieties is the Air Force's inclination to buy multi-role aircraft instead of single-role, close air support aircraft. Single-purpose close air support aircraft would be more readily available to the ground commander. Multi-role aircraft could be siphoned off for other missions at the expense of close air support. The Air Force argues that multi-role aircraft give them the flexibility to better shape the entire battle in support of the theater commander.

In both cases, a service is dependent on another in order to accomplish its mission. Resentment and mistrust can occur when the perception exists that the supporting service prefers to fund for what it considers its primary missions over those that would benefit another service.

In summary, roles and missions are essential to the very survival of a military service. With them come funding, programs, prestige, and sense of worth. Without them a service ceases to provide utility to the country and risks disestablishment. As such, traditional roles and missions assigned to each service are jealously guarded. New missions are pursued vigorously for the same reasons. Service unique missions which impact on another's ability to perform its mission can also be a serious source of friction. In all of these contests, the stakes are high, and the battles are fought by well intentioned service professionals. However, the scars from these turf battles can remain on the institutions and their personnel to breed mistrust and lack of cooperation in the future. True jointness may be the clear loser.

ENDNOTES

1. Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 35-58.
2. Richard Halloran, To Arm a Nation, p. 160.
3. Asa Clark IV, "Interservice Rivalry and Military Reform," in The Defense Reform Debate, ed. by Asa Clark IV, Peter Chiarelli, Jeffrey McKittrick and James Reed, p. 256.
4. Arthur Hadley, The Straw Giant, p. 91.
5. Halloran, p. 155.

SERVICE UNIQUENESS
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CHAPTER III
WAR FIGHTING

The U.S. strategy to achieve a free and secure world is to DETER WAR by fielding sufficient force to FIGHT and WIN, should deterrence fail.¹

U.S. Army Posture Statement
Fiscal Year 1989

From their inception, the U.S. Military Services have either been engaged in, or training for, war. Each has developed views of war fighting based on their experiences in battle. The Army, Marine Corps, and Navy each have over 200 years of experience upon which their doctrine is based. The Air Force has a much shorter history but certainly one not lacking in combat operations. Because of their wartime experiences, each service has a different perspective of how victory can be achieved.

These differing views can become barriers to cohesive jointness and a clear strategy for victory. Edward Luttwak's The Pentagon and the Art of War criticized the services for parochial thinking during the Viet Nam war.

Among the leaders of the different services... a solid pride in their own productive efficiency was mingled with a clear recognition that not enough was being done for victory. Many believed that a war winning strategy could be achieved only by expansion of their own forces to apply their standard methods, but on a far larger scale.²

Certainly any commander of joint forces should have an understanding of service-unique, war fighting perspectives as he weighs the recommendations of his component commanders. Armed with this knowledge he will be better able to distinguish between operational soundness and service parochialism. Further, one service would be more inclined to support another's position if it understood the rationale behind the other's perspective of how victory can be achieved.

This chapter will examine the war fighting views unique to each military service which can impact on jointness. As these views are derived from past experiences, a historical perspective will be provided.

CENTERS OF GRAVITY

In On War, Carl Von Clausewitz defines the enemy's center of gravity as the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.³ The center of gravity is situation dependent. It can include such things as political will, industrial base, or economic system, but Clausewitz sees the destruction of the enemy's armed forces as central to victory.

Still, no matter what the central feature of the enemy's power may be...the point on which your efforts must converge...the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin.⁴

By virtue of their stated missions, and their experiences in war, each service has a different perspective of what it takes to defeat an enemy. In his article, Joint Operations: The World Looks Different From 10,000 Feet, Colonel Dennis Drew, USAF

contends that each service views the enemy's center of gravity differently.⁵ Identifying and examining these differing views may promote cooperation through understanding, among the services.

U.S. ARMY

JCS Pub 2 describes the primary mission of the Army.

To organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land...defeat the enemy land forces, and seize, occupy, and defend land areas.⁶

As such, the natural center of gravity focus for the Army appears to be the enemy's land combat forces. History has taught the Army that victory comes with the defeat of the enemy's army and the occupation of his territory.

During the Indian Wars from 1865 to 1891, the Army conducted 13 different campaigns and at least 1067 separate engagements with the Indians. All of these campaigns had a single purpose, destruction of the combative Indians. The war was taken to the Indians and fought on their land.⁷ Perhaps the greatest example of the Army's focus on the enemy's center of gravity (destruction of his army) was the invasion of France in 1944. Here the Army clearly fought a major land campaign which eventually led to defeat of the German Army and unconditional surrender.

The point is that the Army's method of warfare, the conduct of land campaigns, has been extremely successful in achieving national objectives. With its history of achieving decisive results through the conduct of land battle, it is only natural for the Army to view this form of warfare as the preferred military option.

It can be argued that victory for the Army equates to a soldier standing in the enemy's capital city.

Early in its history, the Army fought primarily as a single service. Little thought was given to jointness. In the Civil and Indian Wars the Army provided for most of its own transportation, fire support, and logistical sustainment. Today, however, the Army is perhaps the most reliant service.⁸ It requires the Navy and Air Force for transportation to the battle and for sustainment. Further, it must rely on the Air Force for close air support. Major General Howard Graves, Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, stressed the Army's requirement for jointness in his recent article, The U.S. Army War College: Gearing Up for the 21st Century.

The Army cannot fight as a single service and must rely largely upon the air and sea components of our armed services if it is to fulfill its role in implementing the national military strategy.⁹

With respect to jointness, two key Army views of warfighting are germane. First, the Army views victory as best achieved through successful land campaigns. Second, the Army needs jointness more than the other services in order to accomplish its missions.¹⁰

U.S. MARINE CORPS

The primary mission of the Marine Corps is defined in JCS Pub 2.

Organize, train, and equip forces...for service with the fleet...to seize or defend advanced naval bases...conduct such land operations...essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign. Conduct such missions as the President may direct.¹¹

As such, the focus of the Marines is power projection through amphibious operations. Their time-tested specialty is forcible entry from the sea. To the Marines, the utility of amphibious operations has been reinforced throughout their history. During the Mexican War of 1846, the Marines conducted amphibious operations to close Mexico's six largest Gulf ports, isolating her, and hastening her defeat.¹² Their island campaigns in support of Admiral Nimitz's drive across the Pacific during World War II are legendary. To the Marines, the immediate enemy center of gravity is any terrain that is vital to a naval campaign. The preferred option is likely to be the conduct of amphibious operations.

Because of their Marine-Air-Ground-Task Force organization, the Marines are a relatively self-contained fighting force. While reliant on the Navy for transport to the objective area, once ashore the Marine commander has ground, air, and combat service support elements organic to him. As such, the Marines are not as dependent on joint operations to accomplish their traditional missions.¹³

U.S. NAVY

The primary functions of the Navy are clearly defined.

...Conduct sustained operations at sea...destroy enemy naval forces, suppress enemy sea commerce, gain and maintain naval supremacy,...protect vital sea lines of communication...14

Clearly, the Navy's focus is on the sea. Alfred Thayer Mahan, a prominent naval strategist in the late 1800s, established the tenets of naval strategy. He wrote that ultimate defeat of an enemy can be brought about by denying him use of the seas for import or export, thus leading to isolation and eventual strangulation. In order to do that, Mahan argued that control of the seas through defeat of the enemy navy was required.15

The influence of Mahan is reflected in the Navy's current statement of functions listed above.

The Navy's belief in seapower is based on a history of monumental successes. The Spanish American War provides a classic example. In May 1898, Commodore George Dewey took the American Navy into Manila Bay and totally defeated the Spanish fleet. Two months later the Spaniards sued for peace.16

The criticality of seapower in achieving national military objectives was again proved in World War II. The battle of Midway severely weakened Japanese naval power and proved to be the turning point in the war, enabling the allies to shift over to the offensive. Five months later the U.S. Navy's defeat of the Japanese fleet at Leyte Gulf left the Japanese incapable of fighting further naval battles. Japan was then subject to

direct threat of allied invasion.¹⁷

With such decisive results throughout its history, it is easy to understand the Navy's strong convictions concerning the value of seapower. It has proven that it can render an enemy's position untenable through naval warfare. As such, it can be argued that the Navy's perception of an enemy's center of gravity is defeat of his fleet in order to deny commerce and induce strangulation.

Traditionally, the Navy has fought its battles without assistance from the other services. Naval warfare is by nature independent. In his essay, The Wars Within: The Joint Military Structure and its Critics, William Lynn had this to say about the Navy:

The Navy has historically been the most independent of the armed services. The Navy remains far more self-sufficient than the other services. It possesses its own air force (naval aviation) and its own army (Marine Corps), and its army has its own air force (Marine aviation). Thus the Navy possesses most of the resources it needs to perform its core mission of sea control.¹⁸

Because naval battles are traditionally isolated engagements, fought alone on the high seas, and the fact that the Navy is a self-sufficient fighting force, jointness is arguably no more than a secondary consideration for this service.

U.S. AIR FORCE

The Air Force had its beginning when the National Defense Act of 1916 authorized Army Aero Squadrons.¹⁹ Later, the U.S. Air Force was designated as a separate service by the National Security Act of 1947.²⁰ Over time, its functions evolved into those of today.

...conduct of prompt and sustained operations in the air...Defend the United States against air attack, gain and maintain general air supremacy, defeat enemy air forces, conduct space operations, and establish local air superiority...²¹

Though the Air Force's history is relatively short, it is filled with brilliant triumphs which form the basis of its war-fighting views today. During World War II, the 8th Air Force's strategic bombing campaign against Germany accounted for the destruction of 65 percent of the German aircraft industry, 48 percent of its oil, and 89 percent of its submarine construction yards.²² These attacks on the industrial base of Germany had devastating effects on its economy and war making capacity. Albert Speer summed it up best when on March 15, 1945, he reported to Hitler:

The German economy is headed for inevitable collapse within four to eight weeks.²³

In Straw Giant, Arthur Hadley points out that during World War II, American Air Force commander General Carl Spaatz believed so strongly in the strategic bombing campaign that he argued against the vast preparations to invade Europe. General Spaatz believed that the continued bombing of industrial Germany could win the war by itself.²⁴

The success of the Air Force's strategic bombing efforts during World War II seems to have laid the foundation for its views of warfighting in the future. In his testimony before Congress shortly after World War II, General Vandenberg offered his views on the preeminent role of strategic bombing.

In World War III, under an air strategy, neutralization and disarming would be the objectives, and land and seapower would support airpower in attaining those objectives.²⁵

In his article, Joint Operations: The World Looks Different From 10,000 Feet, Colonel Dennis Drew, USAF suggests that the real source of enemy strength is found in his industrial capacity to make war. If this capability is destroyed through deep air strikes, the enemy's ability to resist will collapse.²⁶ Nearly forty years span the time from General Vandenberg's comments to the thoughts expressed by Colonel Drew, but a central theme remains -- victory through strategic bombing.

In his essay, The Evolution of Central U.S. Defense Management, Vincent Davis claims that the Air Force places the highest priority on strategic bombing.²⁷ In Straw Giant, Arthur Hadley agrees that strategic bombing occupies center stage among other Air Force missions such as air superiority and close air support. As partial evidence he indicates that not until 1982 when General Charles Gabriel became Air Force Chief of Staff, had a fighter pilot risen to head the Air Force.²⁸

The point is that the Air Force is likely to view an enemy's center of gravity as his military industrial capacity, and strategic bombing as the best method of attacking it.

Like the Navy, but to a lesser degree, the Air Force is a relatively self-sufficient service. Certainly it can conduct strategic bombing independently if it operates from secure sanctuaries although it may require sealift for sustainment. In its airlift role it may require airbase security from the Army. It also relies on the Army for some assistance in suppression of enemy air defenses. By virtue of their missions, the Military Airlift Command and the Tactical Air Command have close working relationships with the Army and, to some extent, with all the services, but for the most part it is the Air Force that is doing the providing through its own resources. The point is that in most cases the Air Force fulfills its war fighting roles without heavy dependence on other services.

SUMMARY

Based on its assigned roles and experiences in war, each service has a unique perspective of how best to achieve victory. By using Clausewitz's Center of Gravity as a focal point, differing services views of war fighting may be constructed. Because it is oriented toward land combat, the Army may very well view the enemy army as the center of gravity. Throughout its history, victory has come through defeat of the opposing land army, and the occupation of his terrain. From the Marine's perspective, the center of gravity is any land mass required to support a naval campaign. Their focus is amphibious warfare. The Navy basically still subscribes to the Mahanian theory which holds that destruction of the enemy fleet leads to isolation of his homeland, strangulation, and eventual defeat. Destruction of the enemy's industrial base through strategic bombing appears to be the Air Force's primary strategy for victory.

Because of their differing perspectives, the services are likely to advocate the use of their particular brand of war fighting as the method of choice to achieve victory. The danger is parochialism whether it be deliberately or unconsciously propagated. Each service has tremendous capabilities. The challenge is to amalgamate these capabilities and apply the right force or combination of forces to a specific threat.

Also affecting a service's attitude toward jointness is the degree to which it must depend on others to fulfill its primary roles in war fighting. The Army is the most dependent

service as it requires air and sealift for transport and sustainment, and close air support from the Air Force. As such, it is more likely to be a strong proponent of jointness. Because of its traditional relationship with the Navy, and the self-sufficiency of its MAGTFs, the Marine Corps is less dependent on jointness to fulfill its assigned roles. The Navy has traditionally fulfilled its roles through self-reliance. It is perhaps the most independent service and therefore less inclined to realize the benefits of jointness. Though the Air Force may require assistance from other services in terms of sustainment and security, it is largely capable of executing its war fighting roles through reliance on its own resources.

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SERVICE UNIQUENESS -
STUMBLING BLOCKS TO JOINTNESS

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS

Based on a review of the information presented, six conclusions are evident:

1. The Goldwater-Nichols Act is destined for partial success.
2. Institutional bias is a non-legislatible hindrance to jointness.
3. Service roles and missions are a continuing source of friction.
4. Service interdependence can cause mistrust.
5. Services have an unquenchable appetite for a "piece of the action."
6. The degree of service self-sufficiency affects attitudes toward jointness.

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 will certainly enhance jointness in significant areas such as command relationships, joint education, and assignment policies. However, there is a subjective, non-legislatible barrier to jointness which can only be resolved by the services. It is institutional bias.

INSTITUTIONAL BIAS. Institutional bias can cause mistrust, lack of cooperation, and a blindness toward sister service motivations and contributions. The primary causes of institutional

bias are service unique roles, missions, and views of warfighting.

ROLES AND MISSIONS FOR SURVIVAL. By applying Maslow's hierarchy of Needs to the military services, it can be argued that as in any classic organization, survival of the organization is a primary concern. Service roles and missions are the basis upon which all service survival needs are established. As such, core roles and missions are jealously guarded. New ones and those lying on the periphery can become a source of vigorous competition. Constant battling over roles and missions, and for funding to procure programs deemed vital to fulfill them, can have deleterious effects on the officers involved and on the services themselves.

SERVICE INTERDEPENDENCE. A second source of conflict over roles and missions occurs when one service is dependent on another in order to fulfill its wartime roles. If the dependent service perceives that the supporting service is allowing the needed capability to atrophy, a potential for friction is created.

"A PIECE OF THE ACTION." Officers growing up within a particular service tend to view victory as best achieved through application of their particular service's form of warfare. In essence, each views the enemy center of gravity differently and can point to past successes to reinforce their beliefs. It is a natural tendency for each to want a "piece of the action" when hostilities are imminent. This motivation in itself is not bad. If the services were not anxious to contribute there would be serious cause for alarm. However, combat effectiveness suffers when service professionals fail to recommend the force mix most appropriate for a situation because they are motivated to ensure that their

particular service is represented.

COMBAT SELF-SUFFICIENCY. A service's motivation toward jointness is influenced to some extent by the degree of dependence it has on the other services in order to accomplish its wartime roles and missions. It stands to reason that the Army, as the most dependent service, would view jointness as beneficial to it. It must work in concert with the other services in order to get to the battle, be sustained, and receive close air support. At the other end of the spectrum lies the Navy. As the most self-sufficient service, it is less likely to derive the benefits of jointness and therefore may view it as a secondary consideration. The Air Force and the Marine Corps fall somewhere in between.

SERVICE UNIQUENESS -
STUMBLING BLOCKS TO JOINTNESS

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS

...My first wish would be that my military family, and the whole Army, should consider themselves as a band of brothers, willing and ready to die for each other.1

George Washington
October 21, 1798
Writing to Henry Knox

The focus of this paper has been institutional bias, a barrier to jointness which may be overcome only through internal service-initiated efforts. As such, external actions such as additional legislation to redefine service roles and missions will not be addressed. Internal solutions must come through leadership, education, and training. There is much the services can and must do to foster jointness. To do otherwise reduces the capability of the United States to fight and win in any potential military conflict.

LEADERSHIP

Any change must begin at the top. It is not the captains and lieutenants who are leading the charge in interservice battles over roles and missions, or for major service programs.

Service chiefs set policy and senior officers implement it. What is needed is a commitment from each of the service chiefs to encourage jointness within their particular service. The direction must be set from the top and supervisory steps must be taken to ensure that the direction is followed.

Years ago, racial equality within the military was a goal established by the Department of Defense. Realization of that goal was the responsibility of the service chiefs. Each made a serious commitment toward that end and instituted procedures accordingly. Every leader knew that racial inequality would not be tolerated. There was no room to maneuver laterally: You either supported the chief's program or you did not. Violators were dealt with quickly and firmly. No career could survive racial violations. Attitudes changed over time but actions changed quickly.

This same commitment must be applied to jointness now. It must be absolutely clear that jointness is to be fostered at every opportunity. Command inspection programs should include an evaluation of the unit's efforts to foster jointness. Command attitudes toward jointness, quality of joint SOPs, efforts to improve interoperability, and performance during joint training exercises are examples of areas that could be formally inspected. Further, if applicable, mandatory comments on how commanders and staff officers support efforts to achieve jointness should be included on efficiency reports.

EDUCATION

Since most joint officer billets are at the mid to senior level, the majority of officers remain within their own service environment for at least the first 10 years of service. It is during this early period that institutional norms and attitudes are assimilated. The importance of jointness must also be inculcated into young officers during their formative years. The capabilities, roles, and motivations of each service must be taught. It must be emphasized that success in battle could depend on the support of a sister service. They must understand that, in war, they will be fighting under the command of a unified commander who may very well be of another service. Sister services must be portrayed as vital to mission accomplishment. Teamwork and what is best for national security must be the constant themes.

Service schools can play a key role in formulating attitudes toward jointness. Faculties should have top quality multi-service representation. Curricula at officer schools should stress interoperability and service unique views of warfighting. Officers selected to attend a sister service school should be the finest available. Attendance at another service's school should be an honor regarded as a cut above attendance at one's own service school. The idea is to advertise loudly and clearly that jointness is important to service and personal success.

Consideration should be given to allowing a certain percentage of students from each of the service academies to opt for any

branch of service up to a certain point, perhaps their second year. A similar system could be worked out for ROTC programs as well. Needless to say, jointness should be an integral part of these program's curricula.

The emphasis in service intermediate and top level schools is the preparation of officers for positions of increased responsibility within their own service and should remain so. However, the benefits and requirements of jointness must be consistent threads throughout the programs. The U.S. Army War College's efforts to provide its students with a solid understanding of joint matters is a commendable example.

The current proposal to designate the National War College as the senior school of the armed forces is a good one. Its purpose should be to educate selected officers from each of the services in national security policy and joint and combined warfare. Attendees should be graduates of a senior service school and have demonstrated potential for selection to general or flag rank.

Finally, a "joint warfare" correspondence course should be created which would provide the basics in joint considerations. This course would be mandatory for all officers upon attaining the rank of major or lieutenant commander. Completion of the course would be a prerequisite for promotion to the next higher grade. Waivers would be considered for those majors and lieutenant commanders who attended a formal school.

TRAINING

Training is central to combat effectiveness. Training which generates a basic understanding of sister service unique problems and warfighting concerns is essential to jointness. The Marines subscribe to the theory that aviation exists to support the ground commander. Consequently, all potential pilots attend a basic infantry officer course prior to attending flight school. Further, cross training and assignments continue throughout the careers of both ground officers and pilots. It is not unusual to find infantry officers serving as operations officers in flying squadrons. Because of this cross training and common experience, MAGTFs are routinely commanded by both ground officers and aviators. The lesson each Marine learns is that if each community understands the problems and concerns of the other, teamwork is enhanced.

This same practice should be applied on an interservice basis where feasible. Exchange officer programs should be expanded at all rank levels. Key staff billets and, conceivably, command positions should be included. These assignments should specifically include membership on major service program sponsor teams. Assignment to exchange officer duty should be viewed as career enhancing by each service and recognized as such by selection boards.

Finally, joint wargaming is an excellent vehicle through which insights into other service's views of warfighting and combat concerns can be gained. These games are traditionally

played by senior officers. Inclusion of junior officers would foster interservice understanding at an earlier career stage.

SUMMARY

Overcoming institutional bias will not be easy but it can be done. Only through a common understanding of its causes can we hope to defeat it. Service uniqueness is a good thing and should be fostered. It begets pride in profession and motivation toward organizational excellence. If Maslow is correct and every organization is motivated toward self-survival, the importance of roles and missions to the services will remain. The challenge for all is to understand this dynamic and to recognize that the national security of the United States is best served by the survival of all of its military services. Honest rivalry is healthy. Institutional bias is not. Reason must prevail.

We are fortunate to have military services with differing views of warfighting. Each provides an option on how best to attack an enemy's center of gravity. National security is the benefactor. However, no service, no matter how independent its warfighting capabilities may be, can fight and win a major war by itself. Finally, the services must recognize that cooperation and true jointness must be achieved through internal efforts. The goal is to achieve the "band of brothers" ideal attributed to George Washington in the opening quote to this chapter. Success in the next war will depend on it.

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